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What was the purpose of the American Constitution? What was it 
made to do by those who made it? This question—which might be at the 
center of constitutional theory—is not explicitly asked as often as one might 
think. Instead, it frequently takes a backseat to other questions about the 
appropriate mode of constitutional interpretation or the specific purposes of 
particular texts. And yet it is an important question. How did the Framers 
(and then the second Framers, the amenders) imagine their own purposes? 
What are legitimate ways to determine their purposes? Most importantly, 
for the purposes of this colloquy, should their general purposes in 
constitutional design have any bearing on how courts review the 
constitutionality of congressional activity? 
I have argued in many places—including in a prior piece in this 
colloquy—that the Constitution was designed for fighting corruption.1 
Others, including Professor Lawrence Lessig, have made similar 
arguments; in a brief to the Supreme Court in a recent case, Lessig 
chronicled in exhaustive fashion the depth and meaning of the word 
corruption to the men who wrote the Constitution.2 
The argument shows how anti-corruptionism was understood as a 
central purpose at the time of its drafting. I have used the text of the 
Constitution, political debates, discussions, contemporary writings about 
the Constitution, and, most importantly, the debates inside the 
Constitutional Convention to show that the men who wrote the Constitution 
saw the Constitution’s job—or purpose, or function—to be anti-
corruptionism. My work builds on the so-called republican revival of the 
late 1980s, when liberal scholars, using the work of historians, most notably 
Gordon Wood and Bernard Bailyn, argued that a fundamental premise of 
 
*
  Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to the terrific editors at 
the Northwestern University Law Review, most notably Nathan Brenner and Chloe Rossen, for their 
substantive engagement in the ideas of this piece, to Seth Barrett Tillman for a truly stimulating 
colloquy on central issues of constitutional theory, and for his generosity with his time looking over 
drafts and sharing ideas. Thanks also to Kara Stein, Neil Siegel, Joe Landau, Ekow Yankah, and 
participants in the intellectual “schmooze” of the American Constitution Society for their comments on 
earlier versions of the piece. 
1
  Zephyr Teachout, Gifts, Offices, and Corruption, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 30 (2012). 
2
  See Brief Amicus Curiae of Professor Lawrence Lessig in Support of Appellee, McCutcheon v. 
FEC, No. 12-536 (U.S. July 25, 2013). 
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the Constitution was self-government and the maximization of civic virtue 
on the part of representatives. The scholarship of Frank Michelman and 
Cass Sunstein exemplified this line of scholarship, which is now 
widespread and in many ways a response to what was perceived as the 
Lockean, free-market takeover of legal originalist history. 
My work on corruption merely amplifies this story and argues that the 
anti-corruption principle should play a concrete role in judicial 
decisionmaking. I have argued that Wood’s and Bailyn’s arguments need to 
be connected to the law itself and to the reading of statutes and 
contemporary limitations. As such, I make a claim that constitutional 
purpose has a doctrinal role: because anti-corruption was a purpose of the 
Constitution, that purpose deserves legal attention. 
What I have not done, until now, is explain how courts should 
distinguish between competing claims of constitutional purpose. A story of 
structural intent or purpose, in my mind, should pass a kind of rigorous, 
time-specific analysis. It should look primarily at the words of the actors 
themselves when they created the Constitution, and secondarily at other 
sources that can help make sense of those words by providing background 
ideologies that likely drove them. 
In a prior essay in this colloquy, Seth Barrett Tillman acknowledged 
the historical support for my argument that the Constitution grew out of 
corruption concerns. However, he is unsure that the history matters. 
Purpose might not have a role, he suggests. As he writes, “I do not see how 
Teachout’s anti-corruption principle, standing apart from the Constitution’s 
text, can have a normative claim on Americans of today.”3 Tillman’s 
challenge is an important one. It forces an explanation of how the great bulk 
of evidence that corruption was a reason for the Constitution has bearing on 
particular legal questions. 
The question of constitutional purpose is analytically distinct from four 
other related questions, which make up much of constitutional theory. The 
first is, “How should courts interpret the text of the U.S. Constitution in 
general?” The second is, “What is this particular text for?” The third is, 
“What are constitutions (in general) for?” The fourth is, “What did people 
in general believe at the time of the Constitution?” All of these are 
important questions, and entangled with purpose, but none of them directly 
address whether and how the reasons for creating the Constitution, and 




  Seth Barrett Tillman, The Original Public Meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause: A Reply to 
Professor Zephyr Teachout, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 180, 208 (2013). 
4
  As a separate matter, there are also nontextual constitutional rules—rules that Stephen Sachs calls 
“constitutional backdrops”—rules that are not in the text but that predate the Constitution and are 
constitutionally protected. Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813, 
1816–18 (2012). The theory of backdrops is explicitly distinct from structuralism. See id. at 1886. In 
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In this Essay, I turn away from proving that corruption was a purpose 
that motivated the Constitution, and I ask the readers to assume, for the sake 
of argument, that it was. I instead shift to Tillman’s challenge: should a 
motivating purpose of the Constitution play a role in constitutional 
interpretation? If so, what role? Original intent of particular clauses is 
frequently called upon to fill in textual gaps in the Constitution. But what of 
original intent of the Constitution as a whole? Structure, in at least two 
instances—separation of powers and federalism—is sometimes used both to 
interpret particular texts and to act something like a freestanding 
constitutional principle. Is this because separation of powers was a purpose 
of the Constitution? Purpose occupies an oddly undefined land—it is 
somewhere between structure, the purpose of particular clauses, and 
arguments about what constitutions in general are designed to do. 
This Essay is an introduction to a generic argument about 
constitutional purpose and its role in court cases. It first examines what 
constitutional purpose might look like if it played a role in constitutional 
decisionmaking and explains how purpose is different than closely related 
modes of constitutional interpretation. I came to this Essay somewhat 
reluctantly—it seemed too much to introduce a method of constitutional 
interpretation at the end of a colloquy, in a short essay. However, the role of 
purpose has played an unexplored, unsettling background role not only in 
this colloquy, but also in many discussions about the role of the anti-
corruption principle. I do not intend this Essay to answer or even fully 
explore purposivism and its relationship to other modes of interpretation, 
but to introduce it as an analytically distinct idea and to lay out some metes 
and bounds, if not set up precise rules. 
I. WHAT IS CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSIVISM? 
I argue that the anti-corruption principle should have legal weight 
because courts should take into account general purposes of the U.S. 
Constitution when deciding particular cases that involve particular clauses. 
We will call this theory “constitutional purposivism.” 
Purposivism is a judicial and scholarly approach that “inquir[es] into 
legislative or regulatory purpose.”5 Constitutional purposivism, then, is the 
constitutional analogue. Purposivism is a teleological method of statutory 
 
some ways constitutional purposivism aligns with McGinnis and Rappaport’s “original methods” 
originalism. Original methods originalism suggests that the way we should interpret should align with 
the way the Framers intended us to interpret. The slight difference is that constitutional purpose can 
exist without an imagined method of interpretation—when there was a goal but a method of 
interpretation was entirely unimagined. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original 
Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. 
L. REV. 751 (2009). 
5
  See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis, 54 STAN. 
L. REV. 737, 737 (2002). 
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interpretation, where the purposes of laws are considered when attempting 
to interpret particular provisions within a law. Not all purposes are equal 
because not all purposes had a motivating role in the Constitution’s design. 
(By constitutional design, I include the views of the Framers, the views of 
the ratifiers, and the views of those who put the federal convention in 
motion.) There are only a handful of purposes that played such a significant 
motivating role in the creation of the Constitution that they should take on a 
legally relevant position. In order to legitimately be called a constitutional 
purpose, it must have motivated the creation of the Constitution and played 
a role in many of the constitutional clauses. Determining which purposes fit 
this bill is not a straightforward task. Some purposes were so widespread 
and shared, they were not even discussed; other purposes were important in 
only a handful of clauses but were arguably more important than others. 
Purpose-based arguments should not be used lightly, but only when there is 
substantial, nontrivial historical support showing that the Constitution was 
designed to do certain things. It cannot be a precise science, but purpose 
ought to at least be recognized as a significant and independent source of 
constitutional interpretation, separate from text and structure. 
Constitutional purposivism already occurs, but most of the time it is 
not treated as a separate type of interpretive discourse, and when it is used, 
it is used in an ad hoc manner, which uses history in terms of general 
purpose. It leads to special treatment of federalism and separation of 
powers, for instance, without a serious body of literature—or cases—
explaining why those two purposes are given extra weight in scholarship. 
This is not to say the question is never engaged. For example, in his 
dissent in Poe v. Ullman, a case involving the right of couples to challenge 
contraceptive bans, Justice Harlan described the importance of purpose in 
this way: “Each new claim to Constitutional protection must be considered 
against a background of Constitutional purposes, as they have been 
rationally perceived and historically developed.”6 Justice Harlan’s 
discussion was in the context of due process and privacy, and his line of 
reasoning has been followed narrowly in that realm, but the general point is 
the argument of this Essay: purposes should be tested against some 
objective measure. The measure of “rationally perceived and historically 
developed” is important because it constrains those purposes that can be 
called upon. For example, one should not be able to merely cite a single 
statement from James Madison showing that he did not want women to 
vote, and then, from that, infer that a constitutional purpose was to limit the 
franchise. Nor should one be able to rely on the tradition of the last several 
decades of treating separation of powers and federalism as constitutionally 
weighty purposes and reject others. Instead, one ought—in each case, or 
intellectual debate—to make a careful, historically supported argument 
 
6
  367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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showing how the drafters and their contemporaries and supporters saw their 
own goal. 
A final, secure “set” of purposes may never be defined because there is 
no infallible test for what constitutes a purpose. But the goal should be 
identifying—through historical investigation—those things that most of the 
Framers would agree constituted a “central purpose” or “persistent purpose” 
in the drafting of the Constitution.7 
Constitutional purposivism is not radical—it is similar to Akhil Amar 
or Ronald Dworkin’s view that the Constitution must be viewed as a whole. 
It is a subset of these approaches, one that focuses on teasing out substantial 
purposes driving the Constitution. 
II. WHAT DOES CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSIVISM LOOK LIKE? 
The question of the Constitution’s purpose is rarely openly discussed 
in cases. However, purpose was a deciding factor in EEOC v. Wyoming, in 
which the Supreme Court held that Congress was within its constitutional 
rights to make the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
applicable to state and local governments.8 The particular question was 
whether the federal government could enforce a federal law prohibiting age 
discrimination against a state defendant, or whether such enforcement 
would violate the Tenth Amendment, as constrained by the Commerce 
Clause. The debate between Justice Brennan’s majority opinion, Justice 
Stevens’s concurrence, and Justice Powell’s dissent centered on their 
different views about the fundamental purpose of the Constitution. Their 
views of purpose shaped their views of the relevant constitutional clauses. 
Justice Stevens saw the primary purpose of the Constitution as being 
the reduction of trade barriers, whereas Justice Brennan saw the reduction 
of trade barriers as one purpose, but only a secondary one. Their 
disagreement led to a different sense of how much weight should be given 
to constitutional purpose. Justice Stevens concurred because he believed 
that the central purpose of the Constitution was “to secure freedom of trade, 
to break down the barriers to its free flow.”9 He argued that “the generating 
source of the Constitution lay in the rising volume of restraints upon 
commerce which the Confederation could not check.”10 He went so far as to 
claim that these concerns “were the proximate cause of our national 
existence down to today.”11 Justice Stevens argued that in order to define 
the scope of the Commerce Clause, one needed to understand that the 
 
7
  The “majority” is too flip a statement. I set aside for now exactly how many Framers would be 
needed. Rather than looking at the precise number, I am interested in those cases in which most of those 
involved would broadly agree on the purpose. 
8
  460 U.S. 226 (1983). 
9
  Id. at 245 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
10
  Id. (emphasis added). 
11
  Id. 
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Commerce “Clause was the Framers’ response to the central problem that 
gave rise to the Constitution itself.”12 The problem was solved when “they 
founded a nation, although they had set out only to find a way to reduce 
trade restrictions.”13 In support of this he also cited a Harvard Law Review 
article in which Professor Robert Stern argued that “[t]he Constitutional 
Convention was called because the Articles of Confederation had not given 
the Federal Government any power to regulate commerce. . . . [T]he need 
for centralized commercial regulation was universally recognized as the 
primary reason for preparing a new constitution . . . .”14 
Justice Powell in the dissent rejected this claim, arguing that concerns 
about commerce existed, but they were only some of many, and there was 
no central purpose in the Constitution: 
 No one would deny that removing trade barriers between the States was one 
of the Constitution’s purposes. I suggest, however, that there were other 
purposes of equal or greater importance motivating the statesmen who 
assembled in Philadelphia and the delegates who debated the ratification issue 
in the state conventions. No doubt there were differences of opinion as to the 
principal shortcomings of the Articles of Confederation. But one can be 
reasonably sure that few of the Founding Fathers thought that trade barriers 
among the States were “the central problem,” or that their elimination was the 
“central mission” of the Constitutional Convention. Creating a National 
Government within a federal system was far more central than any 18th-
century concern for interstate commerce.15 
Neither Powell nor Brennan provide a means of distinguishing between 
purposes; Brennan is more thorough in his sources, but both adopt a general 
purposivism as a legitimate method of interpreting discrete constitutional 
provisions. A more developed purposivism would require that these claims 
be supported by less conclusory, and more textual, analysis of the 
Constitutional Convention’s records itself. 
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PURPOSE OF GENERIC 
CONSTITUTIONS AND THE PURPOSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
Constitutional purposivism is important because our Constitution has 
its own set of purposes, and if they are not specifically investigated and 
argued, their content may be inappropriately assumed. Particular 
constitutions were created for very different reasons. One constitution could 
be created in order to appease a foreign power.16 Another constitution could 
 
12
  Id. at 244 (emphasis added). 
13
  Id. at 245 (quoting WILEY RUTLEDGE, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH 26 (1947)). 
14
  Id. at 245 n.1 (quoting Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States than One, 
47 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1337, 1340–41 (1934)). 
15
  Id. at 265–66 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
16
  Professor Tillman pointed out, in correspondence, that this arguably explains the 1922 Irish Free 
State Constitution. 
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be created to find compromise between domestic powers in friction. A 
constitution could be for getting into the European Union, or for receiving 
international aid, or for limiting overreaching military powers, or for 
entrenching military powers. These reasons are not necessarily exclusive, 
but they are certainly not all going to lead to similar constitutional 
provisions and choices. 
Sometimes when constitutional purpose is discussed in scholarship, it 
is not treated as rigorously as the statutory purpose: constitutional purpose 
is not grounded in history. A frequent kind of argument about constitutional 
purpose is that ours was designed for the same purpose that constitutions 
generally are designed for, and therefore no inquiry into our specific history 
is really needed or necessary. Some see constitutions (as a set) as 
embodying the moral commitments of a polity; others see them as creating 
explicit social contracts that reinforce stable commitments and continuity or 
as reinforcing particular political rights to ensure better democratic 
representation. These discussions involve general questions of 
constitutional society; while they refer to the U.S. Constitution, an imagined 
class of “constitutions” is assumed with generic characteristics and 
functions.17 
In one view, for example, constitutions are important because they 
enable shared, nonviolent civic society—they create a shared identity that is 
separate from group or individual identity and build loyalty around it 
through a shared text. In another, a constitution is an actual social contract 
to which people implicitly bind themselves. In a third, a constitution is a 
practical tool that enables change and efficient arguments through a 
structured document. In discussions about the meaning of constitutions, the 
U.S. Constitution stands as an archetype—there is some slippage between 
the general idea and the specific one, but the question is a more general one 
about constitutions. 
This distinction between the designed function, the actual function, and 
the ideal function of a constitution is often subtly elided in constitutional 
theories. For example, Dworkin, in Taking Rights Seriously, argued that 
“[t]he Constitution, and particularly the Bill of Rights, is designed to protect 
individual citizens and groups against certain decisions that a majority of 
citizens might want to make, even when that majority acts in what it takes 
to be the general or common interest.”18 This seems to be a fairly direct 
claim about constitutional purpose—but it is not. The language used is 
actually quite important; Dworkin claims that individual rights are what the 
Constitution is for, not what it was for. Dworkin’s claim about the 
Constitution’s current role might be about its original purpose. However, 
 
17
  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The California Proposition 8 Case: What Is a Constitution for?, 
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1235, 1239 (2010) (noting that the Constitution is “the soul of a city” and “commands 
loyalty and respect”). 
18
  RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 133 (7th prtg. 1980). 
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looking at the text of Dworkin’s own argument, he shows little curiosity 
about the actual debates surrounding the creation of the Constitution. 
Instead, what he seems to mean by purpose is the best plausible function of 
the Constitution, given the limitations of its texts. That can be an attempt to 
understand original purpose, but it is not obviously so. Instead, the language 
gives a sense of relating to purpose (with the use of designed) but doesn’t 
either ground itself in something other than purpose or explicitly embrace 
purpose. 
Likewise, when Professor Jack Balkin argues that the purpose of the 
Constitution is to create a framework for decisionmaking, he derives this 
argument from his other argument that the purposes of constitutions 
generally are to create frameworks for decisionmaking.19 At the same time, 
he argues that fidelity to original meanings should be limited to fidelity to 
the original meanings of words—not to the original purposes of words. 
Balkin asserts that the central purpose of the Constitution is “setting up a 
basic structure for government, making politics possible, and creating a 
framework for future constitutional construction.”20 He also states that 
constitutions in general  
are designed to create political institutions and to set up the basic elements of 
future political decisionmaking. Their basic job is not to prevent future 
decisionmaking but to enable it. The job of a constitution, in short, is to make 
politics possible. That is why constitutions normally protect rights and create 
structures.21  
Although Balkin typically focuses on intent when it comes to interpreting 
clauses, his method for determining the Framers’ intent for the document as 
a whole is more abstract. Balkin seems to slip between claims about 
constitutions and the Constitution quite loosely. He suggests that the 
Framers had an “idea of separation of powers and checks and balances—a 
system that moderates, tests, and checks; and one that makes politics both 
possible and accountable to prudence and reason.”22 His theory of 
originalism is deeply intertwined with “the designer’s perspective.” From 
that perspective, which he imagines in abstract and generic terms, the 
Constitution is necessarily “a skeleton on which much will later be built.”23 
 
19
  See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
549, 550–59 (2009). 
20
  Id. at 549–50. 
21
  JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 24 (2011). 
22
  Id. at 338. 
23
  Id. at 31. 
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IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
PURPOSIVISM AND CLAUSE PURPOSIVISM 
Constitutional purposivism should not be confused with clause-based 
purposivism, which only looks at the reason motivating particular clauses. 
For the constitutional purposivist, the original intent of the Constitution as a 
whole should shape the interpretation of particular elements. To consider 
the difference, assume that the purpose was anti-corruptionism. In a 
decision about the scope of the Due Process Clause in interpreting a bribery 
law, for instance, I would argue that a court should consider that there was a 
general anti-corruption purpose that motivated the Constitution. That 
purpose will then operate to shape the court’s understanding of the Due 
Process Clause in the corruption context. The anti-corruption principle 
should not trump the Due Process Clause, but help make sense of how to 
interpret it. 
An example closer to my own past work relates to the First 
Amendment. There is a great deal of debate about the purpose of the First 
Amendment. Jed Rubenfeld argues that a clause-purposivist approach 
towards the First Amendment leads away from balancing tests and towards 
First Amendment absolutes, such as, “The First Amendment does not allow 
government deliberately to stop protected speech on the ground that it will 
be harmfully persuasive. Period.”24 Putting aside the substance of the 
clause-specific claim, there is a procedural difference between Rubenfeld’s 
clause-based purposivism and constitutional purposivism; it starts with the 
clause, not with the Constitution as the relevant document. Constitutional 
purposivism examines the clause in light of the constitutional purpose and 
the clause’s purpose, not merely the latter. The First Amendment should be 
interpreted in light of the Constitution’s general anti-corruption principle, 
not merely in terms of its own animating principles. 
There is a large body of scholarship discussing purpose in the 
interpretation of particular clauses. In the extensive debates on the original 
meaning of the First Amendment,25 or debates about the meaning of the 
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment,26 scholars frequently examine the 
purposes of these clauses. These debates have become permanent and part 
of the structure of judicial review of state and federal statutes. In construing 
individual clauses, the judiciary explicitly looks at the purpose and intent 
behind the particular clause. Inasmuch as they do the same with the 
Constitution, they tend to do it less. There is a practical reason that clause-
bound interpretations dominate. Theorists tend to reach the question of 
“what was the Constitution for?” only as a secondary matter—in the middle 
 
24
  Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 805 (2001). 
25
  See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990). 
26
  See, e.g., Calvin Massey, Two Zones of Prophylaxis: The Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Enforcement Power, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 20 (2007). 
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of interpreting cases or when understanding what the Constitution is 
currently for (or ought to be for). 
While courts regularly rely on the purpose of a particular constitutional 
clause when interpreting it, what makes EEOC different is that the 
concurrence and dissent called upon the general purpose of the Constitution 
to interpret the particular clause at issue, rather than looking at the purpose 
of the clause on its own. One way to think about purpose and its 
relationship to the purposes of individual texts is to think about the 
relationship between a building and the objects inside the building. Imagine 
someone comes across a building in which there are many objects. One 
might want to know what the building was initially designed for and 
wonder what the building has recently been used for. Imagine that one 
person says the building was for worship, and the other argues that it was 
for housing. A bowl is found in the building. It is an object that has and 
might have had many (and may have in the future) different possible uses—
it might be a bowl for drinking soup from, or it might be a bowl for 
washing, or it might be a bowl for blessed water used in sacraments. 
Knowing whether the bowl was found in the room in which cooking 
took place or the room in which artistic endeavors took place would be 
useful to understanding the bowl’s function. In order to understand the 
function of the bowl, some understanding of the overall project would be 
useful. Is the building a religious building or a dwelling? Is it a rental unit 
accommodating many discrete purposes? Is the bowl for washing, painting, 
or eating? The building will answer questions about the objects, and the 
objects will answer questions about the building as well. 
The question of general purpose becomes extremely important to the 
question of specific purpose: if the historian who claims it was a religious 
house can support her claim by contemporary documents and oral histories 
of people testifying that it was a church, then the bowl’s possible roles are 
very different than if she cannot support the claim, and the better historical 
claim is that the building was for housing. The archeological disputes might 
also extend not merely to objects, but to entire rooms—and while the nature 
of the structure might be quite clear (ten-by-ten feet, one window), the 
purpose of the structure will require looking outside the structure to 
interpret it. 
Of course, purpose is not the only way to resolve a dispute about an 
object or a space. One might resolve the dispute about the object by poking 
it, throwing it against the wall, or touching it. One could examine how the 
room fits in relation to the other rooms, or to the objects in the room. And 
the information flows both ways—one might resolve disputes about the 
building itself by looking at how the rooms in the house interlock with each 
other (if they do), history, and objects found. But purpose plays a central 
role, and it is a role different than the role played by the structure of the 
building separated from any knowledge of purpose, and different than the 
role played by understanding the purpose of a particular object. 
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As with the objects and rooms in the building, so with the Constitution. 
An approach towards constitutional purpose that argues it has a role in 
constitutional interpretation argues that the clauses and sections of the 
Constitution are better understood if they are viewed in light of what the 
Constitution as a whole was designed for. To explore the purpose of the 
First Amendment without separately making claims about the purpose of 
the Constitution is to explore the purpose of a bowl without separately 
making claims about the building in which it was found. 
The general interpretive position put forward here, which I continue to 
explore by separating it from other methods, has some interesting and 
difficult wrinkles. If purpose matters for the founding, then certainly it 
matters for the amendments as well—at which point the Constitution 
becomes a blend of purposes, just as a Methodist church reconfigured as a 
nursing home has a blend of purposes. 
Likewise, it raises the question of how the Bill of Rights should be 
treated—was it seen as in harmony with, or at odds with, the original 
constitution? This particular question is important for Lawrence Lessig’s, 
and my, arguments about the meaning of the First Amendment in light of 
the anti-corruption principle. One might argue that the First Amendment 
was designed to gut the anti-corruption principle—that the second purpose 
of the Amendments gutted the first purpose of the Constitution. More 
persuasively, as Professor Lessig has done, one can argue that the First 
Amendment reflects and entrenches the anti-corruption principle. This is 
not the place to fully engage that argument—which I find unpersuasive—
just to recognize that amendments are important to understanding purpose, 
and changing purpose. 
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRUCTURALISM AND  
CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSE 
Constitutional purposivism also has a close relationship to 
structuralism, but they are not the same. Charles Black advocated a 
structural approach towards examining the Constitution. In his important 
1969 book, Black argued that textualism and precedent could not—and 
should not—explain all of the Court’s better decisions.27 Instead, much of 
the best constitutional reasoning derives from the structure of the 
Constitution and the inferences therefrom. A structuralist argument 
considers constitutional provisions as they relate to each other, beyond the 
particular conclusions which arrive from clause-bound interpretations. It 
considers the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the structure 
and the principles that the structure embodies. 
 
27
  CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13–15 
(1969). 
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Structuralism assumes “the necessary incompleteness of the written 
document”28 and tries to provide limitations to the range of ways that 
incompleteness can be read. It tends to be a conservative approach, 
attempting to provide similar justifications for decisions over time. Unlike 
purposivism, it allows for the necessary limitations of the framing era 
records, as well as the necessary limitations of words themselves. As Black 
argued, “[T]the textual method, in some cases, forces us to blur the focus 
and talk evasively, while the structural method frees us to talk sense.”29 
Sense, above all, drove his argument: the capacity of structuralism to force 
honest interpretations instead of shoehorning them into textual 
explanations, and the fact that structuralism, unlike textualism, “has to 
make sense—current, practical, sense.”30 
In his famous concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
Justice Robert Jackson wrote: 
 The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot 
conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on 
isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context. While the 
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates 
that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It 
enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but 
reciprocity.31 
Justice Jackson implies—correctly, I think—that nontextual glosses are 
particularly important when it comes to “the art of governing.” This kind of 
interpretation may be necessary to give weight to what Justice Breyer calls 
“democratic harm[s].”32 A violation of the separation of powers—like 
corrupt governance—is rarely experienced as a specific harm, almost 
always hurting society more in its indirect effects than its direct force. 
Unlike individual rights, the group rights accorded members of a 
democratic society must frequently come from structure and animating 
principles, rather than from particular clauses. 
Structuralism requires integrated thinking and reasoning, and 
consistent explanation of core principles. It provides avenues of 
understanding that are only open because of the global perspective. As the 
Court said in 1934, “Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are 
postulates which limit and control.”33 Scholars have also contended that 
“[v]iewing the Constitution structurally provides insights that simply are 
 
28
  Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1601, 1661 (2000). 
29
  BLACK, supra note 27, at 13. 
30
  Id. at 22. 
31
  343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
32
  See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 355 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing 
potential “democratic harm” resulting from “purely political ‘gerrymandering’” of district boundaries). 
33
  Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934). 
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not possible if the Constitution is seen as a list of liberties and little more.”34 
As Justice Souter explained in Alden v. Maine, “The Framers’ intentions 
and expectations count so far as they point to the meaning of the 
Constitution’s text or the fair implications of its structure . . . .”35 Souter 
importantly suggests that intentions plus structure have constitutional 
import. Justice Kennedy made a similar claim, holding that “the fact that 
the Eleventh Amendment by its terms limits only ‘[t]he Judicial power of 
the United States’ does not resolve the question. To rest on the words of the 
Amendment alone would be to engage in . . . ahistorical literalism . . . .”36 
Sovereign immunity comes from “the structure of the original Constitution 
itself,” from “fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design.”37 
The structural principle to which he referred was “the essential 
principles of federalism and . . . the special role of the state courts in the 
constitutional design.”38 A similarly nontextual structural argument showed 
up in Shelby County v. Holder, where Justice Roberts rested upon an equal 
sovereignty principle, one that derived from the general way powers were 
allocated in our federal system.39
 
There are, as Ernest Young sketches, different structuralisms. There is 
the Charles Black structuralism, which appears to be less focused on 
original intent, and there is the Anthony Kennedy structuralism that looks to 
“the original understanding of the general structure created by the 
Constitution.”40 
As a theoretical matter, structure and purpose are analytically different 
things. Structuralism, like the purposivism I describe, gives constitutional 
weight to things that do not show up textually. However, the entire 
document of the Constitution, its purpose as a thing, is not merely 
embodied in its “structure.” The difference between structuralism and 
purposivism is that structural arguments do not always—or even often—
flow from purpose, and that purpose does not always appear in structure. 
While the structure of the government may be created by the texts, it is not 
clear what constitutes the structure of the Constitution, inasmuch as it might 
be separate from the structure of government. 
Structure might be an expression of a purpose, but it might not; 
furthermore, purpose might show up in ways that are not structural. And as 
difficult as it is to determine purpose, it is even more difficult to determine 
what constitutes structure—does any allocation of power in the Constitution 
make it structural? If not, which allocations? 
 
34
  J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1687 (2004). 
35
  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 807 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
36
  Id. at 730 (majority opinion) (alteration in original). 
37
  Id. at 728–29. 
38
  Id. at 748. 
39
  133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
40
  Young, supra note 28, at 1638. 
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Presumably, there are a great number of possible principles one might 
derive from the structure of the Constitution if guided by “pragmatism” (as 
Black suggests) or the meanings of the structure as understood at the time 
(as Young argues Kennedy uses). 
Unfortunately, there are basically wide, relatively unexplored 
agreements about two structural principles that most judges consider to be 
legitimate and necessary features of judicial review: separation of powers 
and federalism.41 The idea of the logic and the design of the governing 
institutions has been limited through intellectual habits to these without a 
serious explanation of how one should choose these structural principles 
among hundreds of possibly competing structural purposes. 
Whether or not these principles are legitimate, they both appeared 
relatively late in the Supreme Court canon of interpretation, and unlike the 
text of the Constitution (where one can say, “These words exist and not 
others”), the widely accepted structural principles do not exhibit anything 
particular on their face to explain why they should be used over other 
potential principles. 
One way to show or establish the slight arbitrariness of these principles 
is to examine their own histories: the term federalism is almost entirely 
absent in the first 150 years of judicial review. Separation of powers does 
not appear as a dominant force in the logic of judicial opinions until the 
mid-1940s. Yet it is loosely taken for granted throughout the academy that 
these structural principles can somehow be divined from the Constitution. 
One can take a sampling from any recent law review article on the 
Constitution, such as the following: “In the United States, for example, 
federal courts create system-regarding rules based on the structural 
principles of separation of powers and federalism embodied in the U.S. 
Constitution.”42 This is not the place to fully excavate those principles and 
the strengths and weaknesses of their claim to be structural principles with a 
force independent of clauses that they are sometimes tied to—the Tenth 
Amendment and the Incompatibility Clause, for instance—but to point out 
that they are in fact treated as having an independent force due to 
“structure.” 
Why I find purposivism more compelling than structure is that it is not 
clear to me how to weight structure and how to “prove it.” As difficult as it 
is to find the purpose in the Constitution, it strikes me as easier to make 
clear arguments for or against a particular purpose. If one purpose 
influenced the textual development of twenty different phrases in the 
Constitution and was a dominant theme throughout the Constitutional 
Convention, one can compare that purpose to another purpose that infected 
only one phrase and was rarely discussed at or around the Convention. 
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  See Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 456–58 
(2003). 
42
  Id. at 444–45. 
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VI. CANDIDATES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSE 
If we look at existing scholarship, there are already several purposes 
used to justify interpretative models. Although I do not provide full 
arguments for or against them, in this Part, I introduce certain purposes as 
possible candidates for purposes that could be given constitutional weight. 
Some candidates for purposes that rise to the level of constitutional weight 
include the purpose of a “more perfect union,” the purpose of safeguarding 
individual rights, and the purpose of entrenching elite power. 
Akhil Amar, in America’s Constitution: A Biography, adopts the 
EEOC understanding of the purpose of the Constitution, taking the key 
phrase “to form a more perfect union” as the one that describes its 
purpose.43 He argues that the Constitution was adopted to limit friction 
between the states. In his view, disputes about trade and foreign affairs 
made maintaining separate states in the period of independence unworkable. 
As Woody Holton writes, this story is so powerful and so embedded that 
“[w]hether the title is Miracle at Philadelphia or The Grand Convention or 
The Great Rehearsal or The Summer of 1787, it is almost as though the 
same book has been written over and over again, by different authors, every 
few years.”44 The core of the “more perfect union” story concerns the states’ 
discord. The exemplary clauses of this story are the clauses that regulate 
commerce between the states and allow for unified foreign policy. 
Apart from regulating commerce, perhaps the most frequently claimed 
constitutional purpose is the protection of individual rights. In a discussion 
of separation of powers, Justice Marshall concluded that the goal of 
different branches having different authorities was to protect individual 
liberties: “At base, though, the Framers’ purpose was to protect individual 
rights. . . . Provisions for the separation of powers within the Legislative 
Branch are thus not different in kind from provisions concerning relations 
between the branches; both sets of provisions safeguard liberty.”45 
Popular references to the Constitution frequently associate the 
Constitution with individual rights. This view also has enormous traction 
among Supreme Court Justices and lawyers, and as a result, many have 
placed individual rights at the center of the Constitution. For example, 
Chief Justice Taft stated, “The Constitution was intended, its very purpose 
was, to prevent experimentation with the fundamental rights of the 
individual.”46 In this sense, the Constitution becomes a proxy for freedom, 
and, for some, a fairly libertarian view of freedom. This is evident in the 
tendency to equate the Constitution and freedom in popular rhetoric. Randy 
Barnett argues that the Constitution is fundamentally a libertarian 
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  See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 21 (2005). 
44
  WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 4 (2007). 
45
  United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 395 (1990). 
46
  Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 338 (1921). 
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document.47 Scholars have interpreted Justice Black’s jurisprudence as his 
understanding that the function of the Constitution is to protect against 
arbitrary government action.48 But isn’t this a post-Bill of Rights 
understanding? Had the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment not been 
added, would the remaining Constitution really merit this description—and 
if not, what are you to do with your anti-corruption material, most of which 
hails from debates on Articles I to VII? 
Having said that, historians with theories about constitutional purpose 
rarely engage with either cases or judicial theory. One group of historians, 
sometimes called the New Left historians, understands the purpose of the 
Constitution through a different lens, with a more dismal view of its goals.49 
They understand it primarily as a power grab by elites in the face of 
widespread popular democracy. Charles Beard, in An Economic 
Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, argued that the 
members of the Constitutional Convention designed the Constitution to 
enhance their own economic interests.50 The modern version of this view, 
exemplified by Woody Holton’s book Unruly Americans and the Origins of 
the Constitution, is that the Founders were self-interested elites who created 
a Constitution to protect their own interests against the unruly, overly 
democratic mob. In this story, Madison, Hamilton, Gouverneur Morris, and 
others are wise but fundamentally elite bourgeois. This story is exemplified 
by the clause that limits the impairments of contracts. Holt argues that tax 
and debt relief legislation at the time fueled the Constitutional Convention, 
claiming that it was both self-interested and genuinely derived for the 
purpose of wrongdoing.51 Beard, though widely read, is rarely cited in 
constitutional theory—perhaps because his elitist reading feels disloyal, and 
because the integrity of originalism should not extend to what we now think 
of as democratic sins. 
VII. PURPOSIVISM AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PRINCIPLE 
I have argued in several articles and a forthcoming book that a central 
purpose of the Constitution was protecting against corruption. Corruption 
was a constant topic in the founding era and a point of regular discussion 
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throughout the Constitutional Convention and after. It was the lens through 
which many clauses—including surprising clauses involving the veto power 
and the size of districts—were measured. Ability to protect against 
corruption was the metric by which Hamilton and Mason, among others, 
said they would judge their own success. In all senses, it was a fundamental 
purpose and reason for the choices made at the Convention. As Madison 
said, he wanted the national legislature to be “as uncorrupt as possible.”52 
Tillman doesn’t challenge these claims—instead, he challenges their 
relevance. If Tillman is right, the fact that the writers, Framers, and ratifiers 
wanted the Constitution to protect against corruption is irrelevant. No 
matter how many more texts historians dig up, no matter how many anti-
corruption manifestos are shown to have motivated the Constitution, 
nothing matters that isn’t in a clause. Therefore, the only question that 
matters for the interpretation of the scope of the First Amendment in cases 
like Citizens United v. FEC53 or upcoming McCutcheon v. FEC54 is whether 
the word offices in the gifts and emoluments section of the Constitution 
included elected offices, and therefore might shed light on the particular 
view the Framers had of gifts in relation to the First Amendment. 
I think this argument has to fail. All meanings and sentences are 
contextual, and one of the most important contexts of individual 
commitments is the reason for the making of those commitments in the first 
place. I come as a pluralist in matters of constitutional interpretation and am 
generally open to seeing the Constitution in flexible ways over time. The 
way we read the simplest phrases depends on overall purpose. “I’ll do the 
dishes,” means one thing in the context of a fight in an intimate 
relationship, and another thing in the context of a contract for employment, 
because the goal behind the particular concession needs to be understood in 
terms of the goal of the relationship more broadly. 
Furthermore, if global purpose is excluded—and only particular 
purposes included—it forces lawyers to find the line between global and 
specific purposes. What counts as particular? The motive behind only each 
word? In a sense, all purpose-based arguments—even the clause-based 
ones—necessarily draw on things outside of the text, in different degrees. If 
the purpose of offices is fair game, why not the purpose of the clause in 
which offices is found, or the Constitution in which the clause is found? 
Global purposes may be hard to delineate, but they are not logically distinct 
from clause-bound purposes. 
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CONCLUSION 
Most of the time, the question of purpose is hidden in plain sight. A 
kind of rough purpose is assumed, and it shapes the thinking of scholars, 
lawyers, and the public. An understanding of the Constitution’s designed 
social function often underlies other debates about methods of 
constitutional interpretation. Originalist interpretations of particular texts 
and nontextual original commitments rely on implicit (or explicit) claims 
about the proposed function of the Constitution. 
In this Essay, I have suggested that constitutional purposivism should 
be embraced and made explicit as a mode of constitutional interpretation. 
There are many more paths to follow in this discussion: What would “living 
purposivism” look like? Might one argue that what the Constitution “is for” 
might be different than what the Constitution “was for”? Should 
constitutional purpose ever take on a freestanding power as a constitutional 
principle, as I have argued it might in the case of anti-corruptionism (and it 
has in the case of separation of powers and federalism), or should it only be 
a method for interpreting particular clauses? In practical terms, does the 
global anti-corruption principle get balanced against the First Amendment, 
or does it merely help us interpret it? Or both? (I would argue both.) 
An implicit argument about constitutional purposivism drives 
separation of powers and federalism, both of which exist as freestanding 
doctrines and as interpretive lenses through which to see particular clauses. 
My hope is not to attack those principles, but that making purposivism 
explicit will lead to challenges of the special protected place these 
principles receive in modern constitutional scholarship and lead to more 
consistent distinctions between idealized purposes and historical purposes. 
By getting at the underlying logic of which principles get special treatment, 
there is more room for understanding why the overwhelming evidence that 
corruption was the motivator behind the Constitution ought to matter. 
 
